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NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS: 
TOWARD A MODEL OF COOPERATION AND 
LENIENCY* 
CINDY R. ALEXANDER AND YOON-HO ALEX LEE** 
We apply the Kaplow-Shavell model of optimal law enforcement 
to study the effects of prosecutors’ use of non-prosecution 
agreements (NPAs) to obtain cooperation on broader 
enforcement objectives, including deterrence of crime. The NPA 
policy of the Department of Justice is documented in a series of 
memos that provide guidance to federal prosecutors on the 
charging of corporations. Prosecutors may offer NPAs as 
alternatives to a plea agreement in exchange for the company’s 
authentic cooperation. A benefit of authentic cooperation is to 
reduce the prosecutors’ costs of case development, both post-
referral and pre-trial. But in order for the NPA to induce 
cooperation, the company must regard it as more lenient (or no 
less lenient) than the plea settlement. Thus, one concern 
regarding the use of a NPA is that the leniency it provides may, if 
anticipated, undermine general deterrence. For this reason, the 
prosecutor who seeks to maximize general deterrence may be 
more cautious in offering NPAs than one who is primarily 
concerned about minimizing the use of federal resources. A 
closer look at the tradeoffs reveals strategic benefits of the use of 
NPAs beyond the resource savings from cooperation. Using our 
basic model application as a guide, we conclude that the policy of 
limiting the use of NPAs to cases where the company provides 
authentic cooperation serves several enforcement objectives. 
From a traditional social welfare perspective, the efficiency of the 
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NPA relative to a plea depends on whether the value of the 
resources saved through cooperation—in the form of increased 
ex ante probability of sanction faced by the offender—exceed the 
direct loss of deterrence due to the leniency of the sanction 
needed to obtain cooperation under the policy, other things 
equal. We also conclude that the use of NPAs—with or without 
cooperation—can facilitate efficient substitution between the 
informal sanctions that attach to criminal conviction, which can 
be socially costly (a deadweight loss), and the monetary sanction 
(a transfer). We suggest extensions of the model in which the 
effect of the NPA is to facilitate substitution into more efficient 
forms of settlement than those that would occur through plea 
agreements alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance (“John Hancock”) 
settled charges that it had “repeatedly violat[ed] Massachusetts state 
law by giving legislators gifts worth more than $50,” such as theater 
and sports tickets and, in one instance, an expense-paid trip to the 
Super Bowl.1 After a lengthy investigation, the federal government 
entered into a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) with the 
company in which it admitted to violations of the state criminal law, 
“paid a substantial fine, and implemented structural, management 
and policy changes to prevent the recurrence of the matters under 
investigation.”2 “[T]he government [also] levied a $1.01 million fine 
against John Hancock, [and] mandated that [it] implement a more 
stringent corporate compliance policy, fire or reassign[] two 
employees .	.	. , and continue[] to cooperate.”3 In other words, the 
government and John Hancock had a formal agreement, not filed 
with or supervised by any court, which stipulated that the government 
would drop the charge in exchange for John Hancock’s ongoing 
cooperation and acceptance of the terms of settlement. Although it 
may have been costly for John Hancock to fulfill the terms of the 
agreement, at the end of the day, it avoided having to plead guilty to 
the charges and avoided further sanctions and adverse consequences. 
The government, on the other hand, was able to avoid the 
expenditure of resources needed to convince John Hancock to enter a 
guilty plea. 
What happened between the government and John Hancock is 
an early example of the growing numbers of agreements that have 
 
 1. Ralph F. Hall, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, in 
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL & REGULATORY 
VIOLATIONS 119, 129 (James T. O’Reilly et al. eds., 2009); see John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 1994 Rulings 646 (Mass. State Ethics Comm’n 1994), https://www.mass.gov/files
/documents/2017/11/15/1994%20State%20Ethics%20Commission%20Rulings%20final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AG2Y-B7B6]. The Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States 
Attorney’s Office noted that Hancock paid the same level of penalty it would have paid 
under a criminal prosecution, that Hancock’s exceptional cooperation was a factor in the 
decision to enter into the civil agreement rather than pursue a criminal charge, and that 
the agreement did not prevent prosecution of employees for the misconduct. See John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company Enters Into Civil Settlement, Announces U.S. 
Attorney, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 22, 1994, Infotrac Newsstand, p0322NE009. NPAs were 
also entered into with Salomon Brothers in 1992 and with Sequa and Aetna in 1993. Hall, 
supra, at 128–31. 
 2. Id. at 129 (internal citation omitted). 
 3. Id. 
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since taken place between federal prosecutors and corporations that 
are suspected of committing misconduct. A NPA is an agreement 
between the prosecutor and the company, without any direct judicial 
supervision, in which the prosecutor agrees not to prosecute in return 
for cooperation and other concessions.4 In some instances, an 
agreement between the prosecutor and the company may take the 
form of a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”). A DPA is filed 
with a court; the prosecutor offers to defer any prosecution until a 
certain date and to drop the case if the company fulfills some 
obligations by that date.5 Such was the case with Prudential Securities, 
which settled with the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan through a DPA in 
1994.6 Because neither the NPA nor the DPA entails the corporate 
defendant pleading guilty, we refer to them as non-plea settlements.  
The prosecutor’s growing use of non-plea settlements raises a 
number of questions as a matter of law and policy. This Article 
sidesteps the legal questions and seeks to examine the practice from a 
policy perspective using an economic approach. For example, what 
would motivate the prosecutor to seek a NPA as opposed to a plea? 
What tradeoffs would the prosecutor face in choosing between 
traditional and alternative forms of settlement? Should the public be 
concerned that the practice of non-plea settlements may undermine 
the deterrent effect of enforcement and thereby lead to more crimes? 
How might the prosecutor’s choice affect social welfare? To answer 
these questions, this Article considers the parties’ incentives in 
reaching this type of non-plea criminal settlement and considers the 
benefits and costs the prosecutor may face. Our understanding of 
non-plea settlements and their operation derives from a series of 
memoranda issued by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which 
provide prosecutors with specific guidance in bringing criminal 
 
 4. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal 
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea 
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015) 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/28/us/brokerage-firm-admits-
crimes-in-energy-deals.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/JX33-SCTG (dark 
archive)] (noting that Prudential Securities admitted to wrongdoing and cooperated with 
investigators, the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan was confident the government could have 
obtained a conviction, and factors including cooperation led to a decision to resolve the 
matter by deferring prosecution); Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & 
Plimpton LLP, New York, New York, CORP. CRIME REP. (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/interview-with-mary-jo-white-debevoise
-new-york-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/3WFD-S9ES]. 
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charges against corporations. We then employ a standard economic 
model of settlement as a guide to the analysis. 
To highlight the overall effect of having prosecutors confer 
leniency in exchange for obtaining the firm’s cooperation, we 
compare two extreme forms of criminal settlement—NPA versus 
traditional plea. We view the role of NPA as designed primarily to 
reduce prosecutors’ costs of case development—post-referral and pre-
trial—by way of seeking cooperation from corporate defendants. This 
makes sense. A NPA can shelter the firm from costs of sanction 
beyond the formal monetary sanction and thereby confer leniency 
relative to what would occur under a plea, which would bring a 
criminal conviction as well as other related risks to the company. The 
central focus of this Article is the question of whether, and under 
what conditions, the use of the NPA to obtain cooperation promotes 
deterrence and achieves other distinct enforcement objectives. 
 Our approach is to explore the enforcement authority’s (“EA”) 
incentive to allow or encourage prosecutors to rely on non-plea 
settlements to close criminal investigations of corporations across 
various scenarios.7 In the simplest case, we consider a prosecutor who 
is myopic and cares only about the budget. In the most nuanced 
setting, we consider a prosecutor who regards today’s decisions as a 
signal of tomorrow’s policy, bringing both the budget and intangible 
effects of the enforcement decision to the forefront. In evaluating the 
practical relevance of the implications of the model, we consider the 
institutional setting and some of the evidence that has begun to 
emerge regarding NPA versus plea settlements. We identify questions 
for future empirical research. 
The outline of the Article is as follows. Part I contains 
institutional background and reviews the practical differences 
between traditional and alternative forms of settlement. It also 
introduces cooperation and discusses NPA as a form of leniency that, 
when offered in exchange for cooperation, can promote the 
enforcement objectives outlined in the series of memoranda issued by 
the DOJ. In Parts II and III, we use a formal model to investigate the 
effects of changes in the objectives of the prosecutor on the choices 
that affect the form of settlement. Part IV discusses other possible 
 
 7. We use the terms “prosecutor” and “enforcement authority” interchangeably in 
this Article except when referring to decisions that necessarily commit resources beyond 
the disposition of an individual case and would be made at the level of the Department of 
Justice or government (enforcement authority) rather than, for example, the Assistant 
U.S. Attorney (prosecutor). We recognize, however, that the locus of authority is not 
always clear-cut and can vary depending on the resource question or the case being 
resolved. 
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effects of the use of NPAs, as alternatives to plea agreements. Part V 
concludes. The Appendix includes technical proofs. 
I.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Debate over best practices for penalizing corporations for 
criminal misconduct dates back more than a century. In New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co v. United States,8 the Supreme 
Court established that corporations can be held criminally liable for 
actions of their employees that occur in the scope of their 
employment with at least some intent to benefit the employer.9 
Because a corporation cannot go to jail and lacks a human mind, the 
extension of this principle from the law governing civil liability to 
criminal law has led to debate over the proper form of the sanction 
that remains an active focus of legal scholars and practitioners.10 A 
criminal proceeding involving a corporation is a multi-stage process 
that begins with the detection of misconduct. Detection itself may be 
a result of an inspection, initial inquiry, or preliminary investigation. 
The case may then be referred to a prosecutor for a full investigation. 
Although investigations can be undertaken by a number of different 
government agencies, the DOJ has the sole authority to prosecute 
offenders under federal criminal law.11 Depending on the strength 
and the nature of the misconduct, other agencies can decide to seek a 
civil or administrative sanction, and can refer the cases to the DOJ for 
criminal prosecution. Close coordination between the DOJ and other 
agencies of the government became commonplace in the investigation 
of corporate criminal misconduct after the scandals of 2002.12 The 
DOJ investigation of the firm may be expedited by the early 
cooperation on the part of the target firm in providing facts or access 
to evidence, should the firm choose to cooperate. Ultimately, the 
 
 8. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 9. Id. at 493–94 (noting public policy reasons for imposing a fine on a corporation 
that profits from the action of an agent when the action is taken using authority delegated 
by the corporation to the agent). 
 10. See Conceição Soares, Can Corporations Be Criminally Responsible?, 3 INT’L J. 
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 45, 46–50 (2013); David McCluskey, Corporate Liability: What 
Exactly Does It Mean to Prove a Company ‘Guilty’?, TAYLOR WESSING (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/en/corporate-liability-what-exactly-does-it-mean-
to-prove-a-company-guilty [https://perma.cc/JS7X-TBC5]. 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. §	547 (2012). 
 12. For example, the Corporate Fraud Task Force was established by executive order 
on July 9, 2002, to facilitate coordination among prosecutors and between prosecutors and 
regulators affected by the financial reporting scandals of the era. See Exec. Order No. 
13,271, 67 C.F.R. §	46091 (2002), terminated by Exec. Order No. 1,351,974, 74 C.F.R. 
§	60123 (2009). 
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process leads from detection to a DOJ investigation to determine 
whether the facts are sufficient to support the assignment of criminal 
liability and impose criminal sanction on the offending firm (and any 
culpable individuals).13 
After the investigation by the government, if there is insufficient 
evidence to move forward with the charge, the prosecutor may 
decline to prosecute. Otherwise, the process may end with a 
settlement or a trial. In practice, criminal charges against public 
companies are nearly always settled rather than taken to trial.14 This 
is not necessarily a bad practice. Legal scholars have previously noted 
the economic benefits of settling criminal charges in the case of 
corporations.15 The important question is the terms of settlement and, 
in particular, how they might affect would-be offenders’ incentives. 
In deciding on terms of settlement, prosecutors, alongside 
company management, exercise conditional discretion. 
Notwithstanding the two examples mentioned in the opening 
paragraphs, non-plea settlements were rare prior to 2003.16 The 
standard form of settlement was a plea agreement that involved the 
filing of an information or indictment, with a guilty plea and thus a 
criminal conviction for the defendant company.17 In negotiating a plea 
agreement, the prosecutor is constrained by the strength of the case 
based on the available evidence, which affects the credibility of the 
threat that a jury would rule in favor of the defendant if the case were 
to go to trial.  
Against this backdrop, the DOJ released a series of memoranda 
to prosecutors on best practices for resolving criminal investigations 
 
 13. We use the term “inspection” to refer to the prosecutor’s act of following up on 
leads and tips to determine whether it is unlawful, and we use the term “investigation” to 
refer to the collection of facts about an action that the prosecutor believes to be unlawful 
for the purpose of determining whether there is enough evidence to justify a criminal 
sanction. 
 14. For example, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s sourcebook, in 2016, 
a guilty plea was entered in 97.7% of all cases sentenced under the Chapter Eight 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, with 2.3% going to trial. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at S-131 (Table 53) 
(July 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/Table53.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVW4-YCCJ]. 
 15. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the 
Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 
17, 17–31 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996) (highlighting the efficiency gains in settling 
criminal charges against corporations). 
 16. A study of criminal settlement agreements entered by public companies, pre-2003 
versus post-2003, found only two non-plea settlements in 1997–2002 (2%); higher shares 
were found after 2003, with 40 (37%) being non-plea agreements in 2003–07, and 115 
(44%) entered in 2007–11. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 569. 
 17. Id. at 543. 
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of business organizations. The series began with a 1999 memorandum 
from then deputy attorney general Eric Holder (“Holder Memo”).18 
This memo predates the collapse of Arthur Anderson in 200219 and 
the current debate over the form of sanction. It sets forth a 
framework to guide the prosecution of criminal conduct by 
corporations regardless of whether the charging decision is being 
made by a U.S. Attorney’s Office or in the main building of the 
 
 18. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], http://www.justice.gov/criminal
/fraud/fcpa/docs/response2-appx-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8UR-EG3V]. This Memo has 
been revised by subsequent Deputy Attorney Generals. See Memorandum from Mark R. 
Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter Filip Memo], http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88WG-3S57]; Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys, 
Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 2010), https://www.justice.gov
/usam/criminal-resource-manual-166-additional-guidance-use-monitors-dpas-and-npas 
[https://perma.cc/5E5V-4EY4]; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys, Waiver of 
Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter 
McCallum Memo], http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/McCallum_Memo_10_21
_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GDY-PPFK]; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys, 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter 
McNulty Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty
_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BAV-UQQK]; Memorandum from; Memorandum from 
Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & U.S. Attorneys, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter Morford Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20
/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6VF-3PK2]; Memorandum 
from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Dep’t 
Prosecutors, Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken in Response to the 
Report of the Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case Management Working 
Group (Jan. 4, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-department-
prosecutors [https://perma.cc/5NJ4-7MXB]; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, 
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) 
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec
/Thompson_Memo_1-20-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM9K-PZRJ]; Memorandum from 
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys et 
al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates 
Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc
/9LH8-SGRQ]. 
 19. Carrie Johnson, Arthur Andersen to be Sentenced Today, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 
2002) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/10/16/arthur-andersen-to-be-
sentenced-today/c9b6095e-36ec-48d5-962c-06a454bef645/?utm_term=.82be0da9f090 
[https://perma.cc/92W7-D583]. 
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DOJ.20 Further, the framework applies regardless of the applicability 
of the organizational sentencing guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission. As the framework has evolved, the factors serve mostly 
as guidance to reflect the varying cultures and conditions of the 
different departments and offices of the DOJ that may apply them.21 
As we explain below, all memoranda beginning with the Holder 
Memo emphasize cooperation as a consideration in the charging of 
corporations.  
A. Guidance for Prosecutors: Valuing Cooperation by Corporations 
The recent history of public statements on best practice for 
charging corporations for criminal misconduct begins with the Holder 
Memo in 1999.22 The Holder Memo set forth eight factors for 
prosecutors to consider in deciding whether to prosecute a case, 
including the “corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its 
agents.”23 It also reviews various forms of cooperation that a 
corporation might offer the prosecutor. For example, “the prosecutor 
may consider the company’s willingness to identify culprits within the 
corporation,” “make witnesses available,” “disclose .	.	. results of 
internal investigations” and “waive the attorney-client .	.	. 
privilege[].”24 The prosecutor also may consider “whether the 
corporation is seeking immunity for its employees and officers,” 
“whether the corporation is willing to cooperate in the investigation 
of culpable employees,” and, more generally, whether “the 
cooperation is complete and truthful.”25 
The prosecutor may, in exchange for these various forms of 
 
 20. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 3. 
 21. The cultural reach of the most recent memorandum to prosecutors is apparent in 
the inclusion of divisions that prosecute cases to which the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines do not apply. Specifically, the Yates Memo is addressed not just to the division 
and offices that were part of the original corporate fraud task force, but also to the 
Assistant Attorneys General of the Antitrust Division and the Environmental and Natural 
Resources Division. See Yates Memo, supra note 18. 
 22. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 1. 
 23. Id. at 3 (instructing prosecutors to consider the following eight factors: (1) “nature 
and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public”; (2) “pervasiveness 
of wrongdoing within the corporation”; (3) “corporation’s history of similar conduct”; (4) 
“corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate”; (5) “existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program”; (6) 
“corporation’s remedial actions”; (7) “[c]ollateral consequences”; and (8) “adequacy of 
non-criminal remedies”). 
 24. Id. at 6. 
 25. Id. at 12. 
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cooperation, grant a corporation immunity or amnesty.26 It is in this 
context that the Holder Memo refers the prosecutor to principles 
under U.S. Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”) Sections 9-27.600 to .65027 
that “‘permit a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for 
cooperation’ when a corporation’s timely cooperation appears 
necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the 
desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.”28 
Thus, from the very first of the memoranda regarding Department 
policy on the charging of corporations, prosecutors are advised on the 
use of NPAs in exchange for cooperation. 
Four years later, then deputy attorney general Larry D. 
Thompson issued another memorandum (“Thompson Memo”).29 The 
Thompson Memo places a greater emphasis on the “authenticity” of a 
corporation’s cooperation when considering leniency and encourages 
the use of alternative resolutions to seek greater cooperation from 
corporate defendants.30 The Thompson Memo refers to offers of 
“pretrial diversion” in addition to amnesty in exchange for 
cooperation.31 As before, the prosecutor is referred to the general 
principles governing NPAs, citing the USAM.32 The Thompson 
 
 26. See id. at 6. 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, §§	9-27.600 to .650 (2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https://perma.cc
/VH2T-FRHT]. 
 28. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 29. See Thompson Memo, supra note 18. 
 30. See id. at 1 (“The main focus of the revisions [set forth in this memorandum] is 
increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”). 
The Thompson Memo introduces a new “factor to be considered” in charging a 
corporation, specifically, “the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for 
the corporation’s malfeasance.” Id. at 3; see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, 
Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory 
and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2006) (“In conducting a Thompson Memo 
analysis, prosecutors examine where a company’s response to a government investigation 
falls on a continuum between genuinely assisting the government and affirmatively 
impeding it.”). 
 31. See Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 5–6. 
 32. See id. at 6 (“[P]rosecutors should refer to the principles governing non-
prosecution agreements generally.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 
§	9-27.600. These principles permit a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for 
cooperation when a corporation’s “timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the 
public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or 
would not be effective.” As Professor David M. Uhlmann points out, this language is 
similar to that of the Holder Memo except that it introduces “pretrial diversion” as an 
alternative to immunity or amnesty in obtaining cooperation. See David M. Uhlmann, 
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1311 (2013) (discussing how the Thompson 
Memo introduced “pretrial diversion” for corporations and led to the widespread use of 
non-prosecution agreements for corporations). 
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Memo might appear to constrain the use of NPAs by introducing a 
requirement that they may only be entered into with the approval of 
each affected district or the appropriate Department official.33 Yet we 
suggest that the approval process could alternatively facilitate the 
development of standards within the divisions and offices of the 
Department regarding the use of NPAs. Indeed, following the 
Thompson Memo’s release, the use of NPAs soon became 
widespread.34 Consistent with the increased emphasis on cooperation 
from the corporation in resolving criminal investigations of alleged 
misconduct in this era, the McCallum Memo on October 21, 2005 
requires heads of Department components and U.S. Attorneys to 
establish written-waiver review processes.35 
In 2006, then deputy attorney general Paul J. McNulty issued a 
memorandum (“McNulty Memo”) that makes it mandatory for 
prosecutors to consider the factors that had been offered as guidance 
in considering whether to prosecute corporations, while allowing for 
judgment by prosecutors in the weighing of those factors.36 As 
experience using non-plea settlement agreements grew, guidance 
became more specialized and focused. The McNulty Memo and its 
successors addressed questions about the form of cooperation and 
what the prosecutor was getting in exchange for non-plea settlements, 
accordingly. The McNulty Memo specifically concerns the use of 
waivers as a channel for obtaining information from within the firm.37 
It sets forth principles for the prosecutor to consider in determining 
whether to request waivers of attorney-client and work product 
privileges as well as how the company’s response to a waiver request 
should affect the severity or leniency of any settlement.38 Throughout 
the memo, the role of the waiver is to expedite the investigation of 
the corporation and the identification of culpable individuals within 
the corporation prior to settlement.39 
In each instance, the objective of cooperation in exchange for 
non-prosecution of the corporation is to expedite the investigation of 
the corporation leading to settlement. Yet a critical part of the 
investigation of corporate crime from the perspective of both the 
prosecutor and the corporation is the discovery of the cause so that it 
may be corrected to avoid a harmful future recurrence of the 
 
 33. See Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 6. 
 34. See, e.g., Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 567 fig.2. 
 35. See McCallum Memo, supra note 18, at 1. 
 36. See McNulty Memo, supra note 18, at 4. 
 37. See id. at 8–11 (discussing the use of waivers to obtain critical information). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
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misconduct. Consistent with this objective, settlement agreements 
often contain provisions that commit the company to reforms, 
depending on the type of misconduct.40 Some of the reforms are 
mandates to facilitate a commitment by the firm to better internal 
policing.41 In 2008, then acting attorney general Craig S. Morford 
issued a memorandum (“Morford Memo”) to address the use of 
monitors and to explain their role in monitoring and assessing 
corporate compliance with agreement terms that are designed to 
reduce the risk of a repeat offense.42 Unlike previous guidance on the 
decision to charge a corporation, the Morford Memo highlights the 
role of cooperation in making it easier for the prosecutor to obtain 
information about the quality of the corporation’s compliance post-
settlement.43 
Later that year, then deputy attorney general Mark Filip issued a 
memorandum (“Filip Memo”) providing further clarification on the 
use of “cooperation” as a mitigating factor.44 Prosecutors were 
specifically instructed to assess whether corporate defendants 
disclosed “relevant facts” for prosecution.45 In doing so, the Filip 
Memo can be seen as calling for greater attention to the substantive 
impact of the cooperation offered in exchange for a non-plea 
settlement of a corporate criminal investigation. 
In 2015, then deputy attorney general Sally Quillian Yates issued 
a memorandum (“Yates Memo”) providing the most recent 
refinement to the Department’s guidance.46 While the Filip Memo 
may have confirmed that there was no requirement for cooperation in 
the form of waivers,47 the Yates Memo requires that no weight be 
assigned to cooperation as a factor in charging the corporation unless 
the corporation has identified all individuals of the company that 
were involved in the offense and all facts related to their involvement 
 
 40. See, e.g., Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 589 tbl.13. 
 41. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation 
Through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 353 (2017) (finding that traditional 
liability regimes should be supplemented by mandates when a firm struggles with 
significant policing agency). 
 42. See Morford Memo, supra note 18. 
 43. See id. at 5–6 (discussing the scope of monitor’s duties). 
 44. See Filip Memo, supra note 18. 
 45. Id. at 9–13. 
 46. See Yates Memo, supra note 18, at 1. 
 47. See Filip Memo, supra note 18, at 8 (“[W]aiving the attorney-client and work 
product protections has never been a prerequisite under the Department’s prosecution 
guidelines for a corporation to be viewed as cooperative.”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018) 
2018] NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS 871 
in the offense.48 In principle, the effect is to discourage partial 
cooperation and encourage full cooperation. Thus, companies that 
find it worthwhile to cooperate fully but would otherwise have 
cooperated only partly will provide more information to prosecutors 
under the memo than otherwise. For other companies, the incentive is 
to provide less cooperation. The intent of the memo is to eliminate 
obstacles to the assignment of criminal liability on individuals within 
the corporation and not just on the corporation itself as an 
investigative outcome.49 
As this series of memos indicates, the DOJ has long recognized 
the policy of offering a NPA as a form of leniency in exchange for 
cooperation as part of best practice. Although the policy on the form 
of cooperation has varied over time, the objective in each instance is 
to expedite the investigation of the corporation and the identification 
of culpable individuals within the corporation. The company may 
report the offense in advance of its detection by the EA (self-
reporting).50 Alternatively, the company may cooperate by 
eliminating obstacles that the prosecutor might otherwise face in 
collecting facts about an already-detected offense, such as by allowing 
access to witnesses or work product, as opposed to impeding “the 
quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing 
under investigation.”51 Further, the company may aid the prosecutor 
in collecting facts about a known offense, such as by taking steps to 
identify the culprits within the corporation and by conducting an 
internal investigation of the alleged misconduct and disclosing the 
results to the prosecutor.52 Finally, the corporation may accept terms 
of settlement that eliminate opportunities to engage in future 
misconduct or, of importance to the prosecutor, remove obstacles to 
the future investigation of the corporation should the misconduct 
recur.53 In this Article, we focus on the use of leniency to eliminate 
obstacles to the collection of facts about an already-detected offense. 
 
 48. See Yates Memo, supra note 18, at 3 (“To be eligible for any cooperation credit, 
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts about the individuals 
involved in corporate misconduct.”). 
 49. See id. at 2 (discussing the challenges of identifying culpable individuals). 
 50. See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 6 (“Some agencies .	.	. have formal 
voluntary disclosure programs in which self-reporting, coupled with remediation and 
additional criteria, may qualify the corporation for amnesty or a reduced sanction. Even in 
the absence of a formal program, prosecutors may consider a corporation’s timely and 
voluntary disclosure .	.	. .”). 
 51. Id. at 1. 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. See Morford Memo, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the monitor’s activities post-
settlement may include reporting to the government on the corporation’s compliance). 
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B. Non-Plea Settlements as Instruments for Obtaining Cooperation 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the DPA and NPA are two 
novel forms of settlement that have arisen after the release of 
guidance to prosecutors regarding cooperation by corporations.54 The 
corporation in each instance avoids a plea agreement and thus felony 
criminal conviction in a court proceeding.55 It does not avoid 
admitting to the wrongful conduct nor the payment of a monetary 
sanction and other costs of settlement, however.56 If, at the end of the 
term of the agreement, the corporation has followed through on its 
obligations, the prosecutor will dismiss the charges.57 Under both 
DPAs and NPAs, the company is released from the obligations of the 
agreement after a specified period of time.58 The company may face a 
lesser risk of costly collateral effects of the sanction, such as 
delicensing or debarment, under either of these forms of settlement 
than it faces under a plea agreement with a criminal conviction.59 
The difference is that, with a NPA, there are no formal charges 
and there is no court filing of the settlement.60 There is no obvious 
channel through which third parties would obtain a copy of the 
agreement. Whether the agreement becomes public depends on the 
prosecutor and the company; there is no direct role for the federal 
courts in the approval or enforcement of a NPA. The absence of a 
court filing might thus limit the publicness of a NPA relative to a 
 
 54. Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009). 
 55. See Morford Memo, supra note 18, at 1 n.2 (explaining the difference between 
NPA and DPA and noting that the terms have often been “used loosely by prosecutors, 
defense counsel, courts, and commenters”). 
 56. Delaney, supra note 54, at 878 (“In a DPA, ‘the prosecutor files a criminal charge 
against a company, but agrees not to prosecute the claim so long as the entity complies 
with the terms of a deferral agreement.’ In an NPA, no charges are filed at the outset but 
may be filed later if the corporation does not fulfill the terms of the agreement.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Biomet Orthopedics, Inc., No. 07-8133, 2007 WL 
2964201, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (noting Exhibit A, which defines a period of 
eighteen months for the DPA to remain in effect). 
 59. Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational 
and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime 42–54 (N.Y.U. Law & Economics Research 
Paper No. 17-34, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037054 
[https://perma.cc/7463-H2R7] (comparing the risks of costly collateral sanctions, such as 
debarment or delicensing under a plea agreement versus a DPA). 
 60. See Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 56 n.62 (2006) (“On occasion, it is difficult to determine if an 
‘agreement’ is a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. .	.	. [In] non-
prosecution agreements, no charges were filed or pending against Prudential.”). 
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DPA. To be sure, for a company with public investors, the absence of 
a court filing may not be sufficient to prevent the settlement from 
being public, regardless of whether it is a NPA or a DPA.61 
For these reasons, companies that value non-plea settlement as a 
means of limiting the cost of the criminal sanction will either be 
indifferent between NPA and DPA or prefer the NPA form of 
settlement for its potential for increased privacy and absence of 
formal charges. Accordingly, we focus on the hypothetical choice by a 
prosecutor between an offer of a NPA settlement and a plea 
agreement and consider the effect of using one versus the other on 
the achievement of various enforcement objectives. 
II.  AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF NON-PLEA SETTLEMENT WITH 
COOPERATION 
In this Part, we introduce an economic model of settlement that 
we adapt from the prior literature and use it as a guide to analyze the 
effects of relying on NPAs versus plea agreements. The difference 
between the two forms of settlement in the model is that, with a NPA, 
the firm faces a formal sanction and an obligation to cooperate, while, 
in a plea agreement, the firm faces a formal sanction and an informal 
sanction. We assume that the enforcement policy is transparent to 
each potential offender. Thus, prior to committing an offense, each 
can anticipate the probability of detection, the sanction if detected, 
and the alternative forms of sanction that the prosecutor may offer, 
including any reward for cooperation that might be offered as part of 
the offer of a NPA settlement (if there is one). 
Our model of non-plea settlement incorporates cooperation and 
shares features with Kaplow and Shavell’s canonical model of optimal 
law enforcement with self-reporting.62 In their model, the prosecutor 
conserves enforcement resources by offering violators a lenient 
sanction equal to the expected sanction that they would face 
otherwise in exchange for self-reporting and all offenders self-report 
 
 61. Given that the company would have discretion over the release of the information 
in a NPA, the publicness of the company may be a factor in determining whether a NPA 
settlement is public. The regulatory status of the company also could be a factor. Thus, a 
prosecutor might plausibly enter into a private NPA settlement with a private company 
that has no regulatory requirement to release the contents of the settlement agreement to 
the public. This is the extreme case where the risk of costly reputational effects of 
settlement would be lower under a NPA than under a plea, even with other things equal 
(such as the crime, the severity, and the company characteristics). 
 62. See Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting 
of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 587–90 (1994). 
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as a result.63 We think an analogy between self-reporting and 
cooperation provides a good starting point for understanding NPAs: 
each can lower the cost to the prosecutor of reaching a resolution of 
an offense. Following Kaplow and Shavell, we focus on a given 
offense and evaluate the effects of allowing all caught firms to 
cooperate and thus become eligible for the offer of leniency, here, in 
the form of a NPA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
model to explore the effects of non-plea settlement.64 
In our model, the DOJ or other EA publicly announces a policy 
with respect to cooperating corporate defendants, and firms react in 
ways that affect the frequency of crime. By changing the policy, the 
EA can accordingly change the amount of crime that occurs. We 
begin by describing the basic enforcement program in which the 
prosecutor is limited to choosing between plea and trial for those 
cases he does not decline. We then introduce an alternative 
enforcement program that allows the prosecutor to offer a NPA that 
confers some leniency (including avoiding conviction) in exchange for 
cooperation (lower cost of investigation) as an alternative to a plea 
agreement. 
A. Basic Enforcement Program 
We begin with the scenario in which a firm engages in an act that 
exposes it to criminal liability and the prosecutor has decided to bring 
the case. The prosecutor can do one of the following: seek a plea 
settlement or go to trial. In the event the prosecutor seeks a plea 
settlement, the firm would face the cost of a certain criminal 
conviction. The company can reject a plea offer, however, and choose 
to go to trial. Whether it is desirable to do so will depend on the 
probability that the company will be convicted at trial. 
Formally, we assume that each company may commit a single 
type of crime that in each instance results in a harm to society of 
݄ ൐ 0. The size of the entire group of companies is normalized to 
mass 1. The enforcement policy and the prosecutor’s actions 
administering the policy are assumed to be public knowledge among 
 
 63. To be sure, there are differences, too. Self-reporting helps conserve on inspection 
costs, whereas cooperation helps conserve on investigation costs. 
 64. In an independent effort, Murat C. Mungan has recently developed a model of 
non-plea settlement that explores the effect of privacy of the settlement on the cost of 
reputational damage to the firm. See Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Non-Prosecution 
Agreements and the Reputational Effects of Convictions 4–15 (George Mason Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 17-40, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3041967 [https://perma.cc/LDC8-YEVZ]. 
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potential offenders. We think this is a reasonable assumption in the 
case of corporate crimes, given the publicness of the DOJ 
enforcement policy (e.g., the USAM, speeches, and settlement press 
releases).65 
The prosecutor sets the formal sanction in the plea agreement at 
a level ϕ ൐ 0 that reflects the firm’s willingness to pay.66 This depends 
on the prosecutor’s bargaining position. The prosecutor’s bargaining 
position will depend on how likely it is that the company will be 
convicted if the case were to go trial (which we denote by a fixed 
probability p) and on the amount of formal sanction (which we 
denote by s଴ ൐ 0) and any informal sanctions that the company might 
face as a result of a criminal conviction at trial. In this basic scenario, 
we assume that the informal sanctions are the same regardless 
whether the company is convicted through a plea agreement or at 
trial. That is, informal sanctions in this scenario arise entirely from the 
company having a criminal conviction. We have in mind the costs of 
unavoidable collateral effects of the conviction that include the risk of 
current or future debarment, delicensing, or exclusion from 
government contracts. This can be accompanied by a cost of 
reputational damage in some instances. We let sଵ ൐ 0 denote the cost 
of the collateral effects of the sanction that arises from the criminal 
conviction, whether through a plea agreement or at trial, and is absent 
otherwise. In summary, the caught company is confronted with the 
choice between a certain sanction of ϕ ൅ sଵ with a plea agreement 
and the expected sanction of p ∙ ሺs଴ ൅ sଵሻ if the case proceeds to trial. 
Deterrence depends on the probability of a sanction, conditional 
on the occurrence of an offense (represented by probability, ρ). In 
general, ρ will be determined by a number of other probabilities. 
Specifically, it will be the product of (i) qଵ, the probability that 
misconduct will get reported (e.g., by tippers, whistleblowers, or 
witnesses), (ii) qଶ, the probability with which the prosecutor will 
inspect or follow up on the leads it receives, and (iii) qଷ, the 
 
 65. In the model, potential offenders must be aware of the enforcement policy in 
order for it to have an effect on general deterrence. Cf. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, 
Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 5 (2017). 
 66. The public release of DOJ guidance on the corporate charging decision enhances 
transparency and thereby affects the conduct of the prosecutor and the corporations who 
are, or may be, subject to criminal investigations. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. 
Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 306 (2007) (suggesting that the Thompson and McNulty Memos built 
transparency into the prosecutors’ deliberative process and thus increased the “fairness, 
discipline, and consistency of that process by forcing decision-makers to justify 
discrepancies more rationally and persuasively”). 
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probability with which the prosecutor will decide to conduct a full 
investigation upon following up on a lead. We observe two points 
regarding ρ ൌ qଵqଶqଷ.67 First, this is the ex ante probability of 
sanction the offender faces upon committing a misconduct. Second, 
although qଵ is assumed to be exogenously determined and fixed, the 
EA (and thus the prosecutor) is assumed to exercise some control 
over ρ, implicitly by deciding how much time and effort to spend in 
following up on referrals and leads (i.e., by affecting qଶ and qଷ). The 
EA is assumed to have no control over p, s଴ or sଵ (probabilities of 
conviction at trial as well as formal and informal sanction upon 
conviction), which are set as a matter of law, policy, and other factors 
that lie outside the prosecutor’s discretion in this context. Inspection 
(or alternatively, following up on leads) is assumed to be costly (i.e., 
c୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൐ 0), and we assume c୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ is large enough that EA cannot 
simply set qଶ equal to 1 but faces a constraint in choosing qଶ. Because 
the EA also must allocate resources to investigate detected offenses 
and build cases, we will consider the allocation of resources between 
inspection efforts and investigation efforts. 
Following Becker,68 we assume that each company commits a 
crime if the expected private benefit exceeds the expected private 
cost from the company’s perspective. That is, if company i expects to 
reap a private benefit of ܾ௜ by engaging in an activity (while causing 
society a harm of ℎ) and the expected cost is ߩሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ, then it will 
commit the crime if the benefit exceeds this expected sanction 
amount (i.e., if ܾ௜ ൐ ߩሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ). To introduce heterogeneity of firms, 
we assume that for each firm the private benefit ܾ௜ is a random 
variable distributed according to a probability density function, ݂ሺ∙ሻ, 
which has support over positive real numbers. The offense frequency 
thus equals the density of firms with positive net benefits from the 
 
 67. This is a departure from Kaplow & Shavell’s original set-up, which models a form 
of industry-wide inspection by a government actor. Prosecutors, however, do not conduct 
such general inspections; instead, they typically act upon being tipped by third parties. 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 62, at 587. 
 68. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176 (1968). For a more recent discussion, see Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 
65, at 8. Differences in the potential offender’s expected sanction can also be obtained by 
varying parameters of Becker’s model. See, e.g., Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on 
Crime, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 82, 87–96 (Bruce L. Benson et al. 
eds., 2010) (considering the time preferences for marginal offenders); Edward M. 
Iacobucci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 189, 189–207 (2014) (discussing outsider beliefs about the offender’s type relative to 
the non-offender). See generally Mungan, supra note 64, (considering the publicness of the 
settlement). 
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offense, i.e., 1 െ ܨ൫ߩሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯, where ܨሺ∙ሻ is the corresponding 
cumulative distribution function. We assume that the magnitude of 
the social harm from the offense, ℎ, is smaller than ߶ ൅ ݏଵ. Finally, we 
also allow for the possibility that in some instances, the private 
benefit may be greater than ݄. 
Without novel forms of criminal settlement, each caught firm 
faces a choice between accepting a plea and going to trial, with a 
sanction under the plea agreement that is similar to, or lower than, 
the expected sanction at trial. For simplicity, we assume that the 
result of getting caught is a plea bargain with a formal sanction of 
߶ ൌ ߶ሺ݌, ݏ଴ሻ. This is in addition to the informal sanction ݏଵ and 
consistent with Bar-Gill and Ayal.69 In this setting, the higher the 
probability of conviction at trial and the formal sanction in case of a 
guilty verdict, the greater the expected total sanction amount under 
the plea. 
B. Alternative Enforcement Program: NPA 
From the perspective of the prosecutor, the use of a NPA 
rewards cooperation by the caught offender and thereby lowers the 
prosecutor’s cost of the investigation needed to justify the sanction ݏ଴ 
under the existing standards of law and policy. From the perspective 
of each firm, the NPA can potentially confer greater leniency than 
under a plea offer net of any cost to the firm of providing the 
cooperation, which we assume to be zero.70 
To explore the effects of offering leniency and obtaining 
cooperation through NPA in more detail, we observe the following. 
First, if the normal cost of investigation for each case is ܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲ ൐ 0, 
the offer of a NPA should change the prosecutor’s cost of 
investigation to some lower amount ߚଵܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲, where 0 ൏ ߚଵ ൏ 1. The 
condition that ߚଵ ൏ 1 captures the requirement of the guidance that 
the prosecutor offers a NPA only if a firm’s cooperation is authentic, 
 
 69. See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. 
& ECON. 353, 357 (2006). There is a rich literature examining the dynamics of strategic 
bargaining. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 
AM. ECON. REV. 713, 713–15 (1988). We simply assume that ߶ is the equilibrium sanction 
amount for accepting a plea offer (e.g., a Nash bargaining solution), and that the 
prosecutor and the defendant agree that a sanction of ߶ together with an admission of 
guilt is mutually beneficial. 
 70. In this Part, cooperation mainly consists of not putting in place obstacles that 
might hinder the prosecutor’s access to facts about the offense and culpable individuals 
where it is costless to the company to provide access. If obstacles are costly to put in place, 
the cost of cooperating may indeed be negative. 
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timely, and effective enough to reduce the prosecutor’s cost of the 
investigation.71 
Second, companies that are faced with a choice between a NPA 
and a plea may be willing to pay a higher monetary sanction and 
sustain other burdens—beyond what occurs under the plea 
settlement—to obtain the NPA rather than a plea.72 This assumes that 
the company places a value of ݏଵ on the leniency it obtains by 
entering into a NPA instead of a plea agreement. 
Suppose that a prosecutor is able to impose a monetary sanction 
under a NPA settlement in the amount of ߚଶ߶, where 0 ൑ ߚଶ. From 
the perspective of an offending firm, the expected cost of a NPA is 
simply ߩߚଶ߶. Unlike ߚଵ, we do not require that ߚଶ ൏ 1. That is, we 
reserve the possibility that the monetary sanction levied under a NPA 
may be equal to, or even higher than, one levied under a plea for the 
same offense. 
Note that in practice ߚଵ and ߚଶ may vary from one case to 
another. In this model, since we are dealing with a given type of 
offense and cooperation for which the DOJ’s guidance applies, we 
assume they are both fixed and exogenously determined, and the 
prosecutor’s choice is allowed to reflect the comparison of the payoffs 
from NPA and plea.  
This leads us to describe the leniency that arises from the 
substitution of a NPA for a plea agreement. Consider first the case 
where ߚଶ ൌ 1. This indicates that regardless of whether the DOJ 
pursues a plea or a NPA, the formal sanction (e.g., the monetary fine) 
the firm would face is the same. Nevertheless, the advantage of a 
NPA is that no formal conviction attaches to it, and thus, the 
company does not face ݏଵ (e.g., the incremental costs of collateral 
effects, such as debarment, or of any reputational damage from a 
criminal conviction) as above. Rather than facing the cost of a plea 
that includes a conviction, ߶ ൅ ݏଵ, the company faces the cost of a 
NPA settlement, ߶. Thus, the NPA is a more lenient settlement even 
when the formal sanction remains unchanged between plea and NPA. 
 
 71. In the basic model, we are making a simplifying assumption that each firm 
provides cooperation. Under this model, every firm can qualify for a NPA. In an extension 
of the model, we could assume that, once an offense is committed, there is a 
probabilityߙ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሿ that the offending firm will be able to offer authentic cooperation. 
Such a set-up would ensure that at equilibrium we observe both NPAs and plea 
agreements among offending firms. In the Appendix, we establish Propositions 1 and 2 
with this extension. The basic model is covered by letting ߙ ൌ 1. 
 72. See Mungan, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that “firms would be willing to pay an 
NPA premium to avoid convictions”). 
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The set-up of our model relaxes the assumption that the formal 
sanction is the same under both regimes, however. We allow ߚଶ to 
take on values other than 1. With an adjustment to the monetary 
sanction, the cost of the sanction to the company with a NPA would 
be ߚଶ߶ as opposed to ߶ ൅ ݏଵ with a plea.73 One possibility is that the 
prosecutor can enhance the leniency offer by also lowering the 
monetary sanction in addition to relieving the offender of the burden 
of a conviction. Thus, the prosecutor might impose a monetary 
sanction that is a fraction ߚଶ of what the offender would face with a 
plea where ߚଶ ൏ 1. 
We note that a prosecutor concerned with the possibility of 
excess loss of deterrence might even choose ߚଶ ൐ 1. In other words, it 
is possible that the firm may be offered a NPA with a higher 
monetary sanction than one it would face under a plea. Such an offer 
can still be consistent with the use of a NPA as a lenient alternative to 
plea if the company might still prefer to avoid a conviction because it 
would face a rather large informal sanction ݏଵ. The higher the value of 
the elimination of a criminal conviction to the company, ݏଵ, the 
greater the room for a partially offsetting increase in the monetary 
sanction. Separately, for the time being, we assume the cost of 
cooperation to the company is zero74 and that if ߚଶ߶ ൌ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ, the 
company will still prefer a NPA over a plea. The NPA policies are 
implementable over a wide range of monetary sanctions, subject to 
the constraint that ߚଶ ∈ ሺ0,1 ൅ ݏଵ ോ ߶ሻ. Obviously, if ߚଶ߶ ൐ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ, 
then the company should prefer a plea agreement, and would never 
agree to a NPA.  
For this reason, in our model, we formally define leniency to 
mean ߚଶ߶ ൏ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ, the condition under which the company would 
(weakly) prefer the NPA. The value of leniency to the company is 
 
 73. Generally, ߚଶ may be equal to 1, but it may also be greater than or less than 1, and ݏଵ may be greater than or equal to the expected cost of collateral sanctions arising from 
the conviction, such as exclusion from future dealings with the government. For example, 
if the settlement is more public under the plea than under the NPA, ݏଵ may be greater 
than the cost of the collateral sanction by an amount equal to the cost of reputational 
damage from the reactions of outsiders to the plea relative to the NPA settlement. 
 74. That is, we consider cooperation as an action or process that is costless to the firm 
and informative to the prosecutor. Relaxing this assumption has the effect of reducing the 
expected cost savings to the company from the NPA. If the cost of cooperation to the 
company is high enough, the leniency value of the NPA may disappear, and the company 
may end up preferring the plea agreement as a way to avoid paying not just the penalty 
but also the cost of collecting the facts (or other effort required) to justify the penalty 
under existing legal or policy standards. In terms of our model, if the cost to the company 
of cooperation is ܿୡ୭୭୮ ൐ 0, then the firm would consider the NPA more cost-effective (or 
no less cost-effective) as long as ߚଶ߶ ൅ ܿୡ୭୭୮ ൑ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ. 
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greatest in the case of complete amnesty ሺߚଶ ൌ 0ሻ and is smallest 
when the company is indifferent between the NPA and plea i.e., when 
ߚଶ߶ ൌ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ. 
Table 1 below lists the variables and parameters in this model. 
Part III examines the choice of the prosecutor who is able to 
substitute a NPA for a plea agreement to obtain cooperation, after 
which we turn to the bundling of the use of a NPA with other 
enforcement strategies. 
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 Harm to society of a single occurrence of crime 
 Private benefit to firm  of committing the crime 
 Probability density function of firms’ benefits from committing the crime 
 (Fixed) probability of conviction in case of trial 
 Ex ante probability of sanction for the offender upon committing the crime 
 Probability that misconduct will get reported by tippers, whistleblowers, or witnesses 
 Probability that the prosecutor will inspect or follow up on the leads it receives 
 Probability that the prosecutor will decide to conduct a full investigation upon following up on 
a lead 
 Formal sanction specified in a plea settlement 
 Formal sanction in case of conviction at trial 
 Informal sanction in case of conviction by plea or trial (i.e., cost of reputational or collateral effects, 
such as exclusion from government dealings) 
 Cost of inspection for the prosecutor 
 Cost of investigation for the prosecutor 
 The prosecutor’s total budget 
 Cost of investigation with the firm’s cooperation as a fraction of the cost of investigation without 
any cooperation 
 Monetary sanction under NPA as a fraction of the monetary sanction under a plea 
Table 1: Variables and Parameters 
 
III.  APPLYING THE BASIC MODEL: PROSECUTOR CHOICE UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES 
Next, we consider how the ability to offer leniency in exchange 
for cooperation through a NPA affects the incentives of a prosecutor 
who faces not only a single hypothetical case but a population of cases 
96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018) 
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of a given type, each calling for the use of resources to develop the 
case for trial. Whether the prosecutor would want to offer a NPA to 
every offending firm depends on the enforcement objective. To 
illustrate this, we consider a series of scenarios in which the 
prosecutor is confronted with distinct objectives. The point is that the 
number of firms that actually get leniency will depend not just on 
whether use of NPA is part of the policy but also on the incentives of 
the prosecutor who applies the policy.75 
A. Objective #1: Conserving Enforcement Resources 
As a benchmark for comparison, we consider the hypothetical 
prosecutor who cares only about freeing up enforcement resources 
through the more efficient resolution of criminal investigations. From 
a traditional welfare perspective, the prosecutor may regard the 
sanction as welfare-neutral, as it would be if it were a wealth transfer 
between each firm and the government with no other consequences. 
Such an objective may be difficult to sustain in practice: it would 
imply that the prosecutor is excluding from consideration the long-
run outcome of the settlement policy. 
Nevertheless, in this scenario, the value to the prosecutor of 
being able to offer non-plea settlements to all firms that provide 
authentic cooperation is simply the value of the saved enforcement 
resources. This is the product of the expected cost of investigating 
firms whose offenses are referred to the prosecutor after being 
detected, on the one hand, and the proportion of the investigation 
cost saved, on the other. A prosecutor who faces an objective of 
minimizing the use of resources to settle cases, and only that 
objective, would thus prefer to use a NPA rather than a plea in each 
instance. This is without any adjustment to the monetary sanction 
(i.e., with ߚଶ ൌ 1). 
In summary, the prosecutor can maximize the savings of 
enforcement resources by offering a NPA to each company that is 
willing to cooperate. This behavior is not what we observe in practice, 
however. Prosecutors use a variety of forms of settlement. Thus, we 
turn to other objectives that might more realistically characterize the 
incentive environment of the prosecutor in choosing between NPA 
and plea. 
 
 75. The incentives of the prosecutor are considered here as distinct from the objective 
of the law, such as that of incapacitating the offender or deterring a future offense. See, 
e.g., Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 65, at 12 (“Generally speaking, there are two 
mechanisms through which criminal-justice policy reduces crime: deterrence and 
incapacitation.”). 
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B. Objective #2: Maximizing Proceeds and Resource Savings 
The prosecutor may seek to increase the aggregate proceeds that 
accrue from settlement while limiting the use of enforcement 
resources. The assumption that prosecutors care about increasing 
their aggregate proceeds is consistent with the models of plea 
bargaining by Landes and Bar-Gill and Ayal.76 There are two ways to 
use a NPA to obtain an increase in the aggregate settlement proceeds, 
net of the enforcement resource cost. 
First, the prosecutor could monetize the value that firms place on 
having a NPA rather than a plea settlement. This could be done by 
raising the monetary sanction imposed in the NPA above what it 
would be in the plea agreement for the same offender and offense. In 
other words, if ߚଶ ൐ 1, the prosecutor would strictly prefer a NPA to 
obtain both the higher proceeds (e.g., higher revenue from fines  and 
to save on investigation costs. 
Second, even without a higher monetary sanction, the use of a 
NPA should enable the prosecutor to increase settlement proceeds in 
the aggregate—by settling each case more quickly and with lesser 
demand on the prosecutor’s resources. In other words, even if ߚଶ ൑ 1, 
the prosecutor would prefer a NPA if the savings from reduced 
investigation costs were sufficiently high to offset the loss in proceeds. 
In summary, the NPA policy can pay off from the perspective of 
both proceeds and budgetary resources. The prosecutor may increase 
the monetary sanction to capture some of the gain to each firm that is 
relieved of criminal conviction and also capture the resource savings 
that come from the decline in case-preparation costs that is the direct 
result of authentic cooperation. In practice, the prosecutor need not 
raise the monetary sanction under the NPA to a higher level than 
what it would be under the traditional plea regime, however. The 
prosecutor could use the resources that are freed up by cooperation 
to generate more settlements, and thus more settlement proceeds, 
even if the monetary sanction remains the same under the NPA as in 
the plea agreement. Indeed, in the case where cooperation is costly to 
the offending firm, a strategy of lowering the monetary sanction as an 
increased reward for cooperation could increase in the resulting 
resource savings and proceeds above what occurs under the 
traditional plea settlement. 
All of this assumes no effect on general deterrence, as would 
occur if offending firms were unable to anticipate the ability to obtain 
 
 76. See Bar Gill & Ayal, supra note 69, at 357; William M. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 63–64 (1971). 
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leniency through a NPA. The resource savings and increased 
proceeds are entirely a result of the increased bargaining power of the 
prosecutor under the NPA policy. Enforcement policies, however, are 
generally designed to improve deterrence. 
C. Objective #3: Maximizing Deterrence with a Fixed Budget 
Turning to the effect of the NPA policy when the objective is to 
maximize general deterrence, we suppose now that the prosecutor is 
interested in deterring occurrences of misconduct as much as possible. 
Suppose in this hypothetical that the government controls the actions 
of the prosecutor by allocating a fixed budget to cover both its 
inspection costs and investigation costs. This introduces a constrained 
optimization problem for the prosecutor with a solution that requires 
finding the best mix of effort—here, between inspection and 
investigation—to achieve the enforcement objectives. Such an 
optimization problem appears to be consistent with the U.S. Attorney 
Manual’s directive to “maximize the impact of federal resources on 
crime.”77 
To understand how the NPA influences the prosecutor’s 
preferred choice when the objective is to maximize deterrence, we 
need to consider how companies are likely to behave in anticipation 
of the possibility of leniency. Formally, the direct effect of the NPA 
on deterrence can be seen by comparing the company’s total expected 
sanction under a plea regime with that under the NPA regime. If the 
introduction of the NPA were to cause companies to anticipate a 
lower cost of crime in the form of more lenient settlements, the effect 
would be to increase the net benefit of committing a crime to the 
company; deterrence would suffer accordingly. 
To be more specific, recall the default condition for violation 
under the basic enforcement program: ܾ௜ ൐ ߩ୮୪ୣୟሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ. Here, ߩ୮୪ୣୟ 
denotes the ex ante probability of sanction faced by the offender 
under the plea regime. In other words, each firm is assumed to 
commit a crime when the benefit it reaps from doing so exceeds the 
total expected sanction it will face in the future, which is the product 
of the total sanctions it will face upon getting caught and the 
 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at § 9-27.300; see also Holder Memo, supra 
note 18, at 11 (“Once the decision to charge is made, the same rules as govern charging 
natural persons apply. These rules require ‘a faithful and honest application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines’ and an ‘individualized assessment of the extent to which particular 
charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the 
Federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of Federal resources on crime.’” (citing 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at § 9-27.300)). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018) 
2018] NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS 885 
probability that it will be caught. This threshold condition changes in 
case of a NPA as follows: ܾ௜ ൐ ߩ୒୔୅ሺߚଶ߶ሻ, where ߩ୒୔୅ is the ex ante 
probability of sanction faced by the offender under the NPA regime. 
Under this condition, the informal sanction, ݏଵ, is eliminated from the 
inequality to reflect that the NPA does not result in the informal 
sanctions for the company that come with a public felony conviction. 
On the other hand, the formal sanction is multiplied by a factor of ߚଶ 
to indicate that the defendant would be subject to a sanction amount 
corresponding to a NPA rather than a plea. 
If the probability of sanction were held constant under these two 
regimes (i.e., ߩ୮୪ୣୟ ൌ ߩ୒୔୅), there would potentially be less deterrence 
under the NPA regime: since leniency implies that ߚଶ߶ ൏ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ, each 
firm may face a lower expected sanction under the NPA regime. This 
suggests a tendency for the use of a NPA to reduce the deterrence 
effect due to leniency. Nevertheless, we should not expect the 
probability of sanction to be held constant. Because the NPAs are 
granted only to offenders who assist in their own investigation (i.e., 
ߚଵ ൏ 1), the prosecutor will be left with more resources to devote to 
inspection effort or investigation of other cases (i.e., ݍଶ and/or ݍଷ will 
increase), and thus, we can expect ߩ୒୔୅ to be greater than ߩ୮୪ୣୟ. 
The effect of offering leniency to cooperating offenders is the 
subject of the model that Kaplow and Shavell develop to study the 
use of self-reporting to reduce costs of inspection by a government 
administrator. They show how a decline in the sanction imposed on 
those who self-report their violations can nonetheless improve social 
welfare because the EA may conserve on resources in return, which 
can be devoted to increasing inspection.78 A similar argument applies 
in our model of non-plea settlement. In the absence of non-plea 
settlement, the EA does not have the benefit of cooperation and thus 
must bear the full investigation cost. With a NPA, the EA has the 
possibility of incurring a lower cost of investigation to build her case 
and thus has more resources left for inspection or for more 
investigations. The effect is to increase the frequency of settlement 
and thus the probability that an offender will receive a sanction. 
If the prosecutor can obtain cooperation for free—in the sense of 
not having to offer any leniency to achieve the lower investigation 
cost (i.e., if ߚଶ߶ ൌ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ—there is no loss in deterrence, and the use 
of non-plea settlement to obtain cooperation would have no adverse 
 
 78. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 62 at 585–97 (discussing how an enforcement 
model with a self-reporting regime—in which those who report their own crimes face 
reduced fines—can lead to a reduction in enforcement resources and is ultimately more 
efficient). 
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effects. The puzzle of whether non-plea settlement is in the social 
interest emerges in the case where the prosecutor offers leniency—
here, ߚଶ߶ ൑ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ—to ensure a sufficient incentive for the firm to 
cooperate. The answer is that since ߚଵ ൏ 1, the prosecutor will have 
more resources to devote to detection efforts, which raises the 
probability of a sanction for other offenders. 
In this setting, there is always some price the prosecutor is willing 
to pay to get a given amount of cooperation and in turn the ability to 
settle more cases on the fixed budget. In any case, it is clear that 
whatever the budget is, a prosecutor seeking to maximize deterrence 
will spend it all. Thus, if the budget is fixed at ܤ ൐ 0, under the basic 
program, the prosecutor will choose the inspection and investigation 
frequency ݍଶ and ݍଷ so that 
 
ܤ ൌ ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯ሺ1 െ ܨሺߩሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻሻ. 
 
In the extreme alternative scenario of a prosecutor who opts to settle 
all cases with cooperation under the NPA policy, he will choose ݍଶ 
and ݍଷ so that 
 
ܤ ൌ ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷߚଵܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯ሺ1 െ ܨሺߚଶߩ߶ሻሻ. 
 
A comparison of these alternatives leads to the following result 
under the assumptions of our model: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 (NPA AND DETERRENCE UNDER A FIXED 
BUDGET). Deterrence can improve by the prosecutor’s reliance 
on NPAs if the increase in cases resolved is high relative to the 
value to the offender of the leniency conferred. This can 
happen in one of two ways. First, if the prosecutor imposes the 
same amount of formal sanction under the NPA as under the 
plea (i.e., ߚଶ ൌ 1), the NPA policy can enhance deterrence if 
the informal sanction attaching to the plea is sufficiently small. 
Second, if the prosecutor can impose a different amount of 
formal sanction under the NPA, then for each level of 
cooperation required by the prosecutor (ߚଵ ൏ 1) and any 
informal sanction ݏଵ ൐ 0, there exists a sanction sufficiently 
high that deterrence can improve.   
The proof is included in the Appendix. The intuition of the proof 
is that when there are no informal sanctions and the formal sanctions 
must remain unchanged between a NPA and a plea, the probability of 
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sanction ߩ୒୔୅ will be greater than ߩ୮୪ୣୟ since the resources saved 
from cooperation can be used to increase the inspection or 
investigation frequency. Therefore, the expected sanctions will be 
greater under the NPA, and the result will continue to hold as long as 
informal sanctions remain small. Second, suppose the prosecutor can 
impose a higher sanction under a NPA than under a plea. Then if the 
monetary sanction with a NPA is characterized by ߚଶ arbitrarily close 
to 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶, the company would then enjoy minimal leniency, and yet 
firms would still prefer a NPA over a plea. In that case, the direct 
effect of using a NPA is negligible: even without any change in ߩ, the 
prosecutor can achieve nearly the same amount of deterrence with a 
NPA as he can with a plea. Since a NPA is assumed to reduce 
investigative costs, the prosecutor can then divert his saved resources 
to increase ߩ. Thus, ߩ୒୔୅ will also be greater than ߩ୮୪ୣୟ, and the result 
will continue to hold as long as ߚଶ is sufficiently close to 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶. 
This result has implications for the design of the NPA policy. In 
order to avoid the unintended consequence of a loss in general 
deterrence as a result of the offer of leniency to obtain cooperation, 
the prosecutor can ensure that the monetary sanction imposed under 
the NPA is not too low. If the prosecutor is unable to adjust the 
monetary sanction to compensate for the adverse effect of leniency 
on general deterrence, the prosecutor seeking to maximize general 
deterrence on a fixed budget should offer NPAs more sparingly. 
Proposition 1 joins the ongoing debate regarding the overall 
effect on deterrence of NPAs in those instances where NPA would 
eliminate a risk of collateral sanctions and other costs that a firm 
would face under a plea agreement. One view is that, by conferring 
leniency, NPAs will not have the same deterrent effect as a plea 
agreement. Missing from this argument is the observation that 
prosecutors require authentic cooperation from offenders as a 
condition for conferring leniency through a NPA. If the leniency 
discount is bundled with a sufficient requirement for cooperation (or 
an adjustment to the monetary sanction), the net effect of the NPA 
policy is to enhance and not diminish general deterrence. This applies 
even when the NPA policy leads each firm to face a lower sanction 
than it would otherwise. Formally, the question of whether the NPA 
diminishes or enhances general deterrence hinges not on whether sଵ 
is present or absent, but instead on whether ߩ୒୔୅ሺߚଶ߶ሻ ൐ߩ୮୪ୣୟሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ. 
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D. Objective #4: Enforcement Resources and Social Welfare 
Now consider the prosecutor’s choices in the absence of a formal 
budget constraint. The prosecutor may regard cooperation as a means 
of lowering the cost of the investigations that are required to justify 
the collection of settlement proceeds from offending companies. 
Formally, the prosecutor would solve an unconstrained optimization 
problem in which the enforcement resource constraint is incorporated 
into the objective function. 
We consider social welfare following Kaplow and Shavell’s 
formulation, in which the objective function includes the private 
benefit accruing to corporate defendants from misconduct along with 
the cost to the victims of the misconduct and the cost of inspection.79 
One important difference is that we have informal sanctions in the 
mix, which is assumed to be a net cost to society. 
To summarize, we study the choice problem of the prosecutor 
who has some control over the ex ante probability of sanction for the 
offender, ߩ, and seeks to maximize the overall social welfare, defined 
as the sum of the private benefits reaped by firms less the costs faced 
firms, the harm to society incurred by the offenses, and the 
prosecutor’s resource costs. The prosecutor can offer leniency (i.e., 
ߚଶ߶ ൑ ߶ ൅ ݏଵ) in exchange for cooperation, which in turn reduces the 
prosecutor’s investigation costs (i.e., ߚଵ ൏ 1). If the sanction 
probability that maximizes social welfare under the plea regime is 
nonzero,80 we have the following result under the assumptions of our 
model, which is similar to Proposition 1: 
 
PROPOSITION 2 (NPA AND SOCIAL WELFARE). The 
net social welfare can increase by the prosecutor’s 
reliance on NPA if the increase in cases resolved is 
high relative to the value to the offender of the 
leniency conferred. This can happen in one of two 
ways. First, if the prosecutor must impose the same 
amount of formal sanction under the NPA as it would 
under the plea (i.e., ߚଶ ൌ 1), then the use of NPA can 
enhance net social welfare if the informal sanction 
attaching to a plea is sufficiently small. Second, if the 
prosecutor can impose a different formal sanction 
 
 79. Id. at 586. 
 80. If the inspection cost is high, for example, it is possible for the optimal inspection 
frequency to be zero. See id. (discussing the same possibility). We do not, however, 
consider such a scenario to be realistic. 
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under the NPA, for each level of cooperation required 
by the prosecutor (ߚଵ ൏ 1), there is a sanction 
sufficiently high that net social welfare can improve. 
The proof is included in the Appendix. The basic idea is similar 
to Proposition 1. When ߚଶ is very close to 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶, then the adverse 
effect of leniency on deterrence (if any) is negligible. In this case, the 
NPA is socially beneficial (and preferred to a plea) simply because 
even at the same detection probability, the deterrence effect will be 
nearly identical, but the prosecutor in turn will save resources through 
cooperation, and the NPA involves no informal sanctions. But there 
is a second important effect of a NPA. Specifically, when ߚଶ is close to 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶, the NPA policy effectively facilitates an efficient 
substitution between informal sanctions (which can be net costly to 
society) and a fine (which is a transfer). This way a NPA policy can 
ensure that the deterrence effect remains nearly identical, but society 
can avoid the cost arising from the informal sanctions. This is an 
additional benefit of the NPA, apart from the budgetary resource 
savings. 
Meanwhile, we note that, if the NPA is bundled with a penalty ߚଶ 
that is arbitrarily close to 0, each firm can anticipate amnesty, and 
there would effectively be no deterrence effect even if the probability 
ߩ is high. A plea agreement would then be the preferred choice. 
IV.  OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR NPA?: THE DISCRIMINATING 
PROSECUTOR WITH BUNDLING 
While our objective is to examine the effect of using NPAs on 
broader enforcement objectives, the series of DOJ policy statements 
points to further effects of their use. In particular, the prosecutor may 
bundle reform requirements and mandates into the NPA as a 
condition for leniency, and offending firms may react in ways that 
may have implications for the achievement of the enforcement 
objective. We consider three possibilities. First, prosecutors can use 
the added leniency that is possible in a NPA to settle cases that would 
otherwise be declined. The effect is to extend the scope of criminal 
enforcement and the frequency with which misconduct leads to a 
criminal sanction. Second, prosecutors may use the added leniency to 
convince the offending firm to accept provisions—such as 
commitments to self-reporting or future cooperation—that increase 
its expected sanction for a future offense. The prosecutor would then 
face lower costs of future detection and investigation of high-risk 
offenders. The effect is to improve general deterrence. Third, we note 
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that the prosecutor’s use of a NPA may have the effect, in the short 
term, of changing the profile of the corporation that pleads guilty to 
an offense, and in the long term, of encouraging firms to invest more 
fully in robust compliance programs specifically to prepare 
themselves to provide authentic cooperation in the event of a criminal 
investigation. 
A. Use of NPA in Complex Cases to Extend the Scope of Criminal 
Enforcement 
One possible benefit of using NPAs is that such agreements can 
enable prosecutors to resolve weaker cases—for example, complex 
cases that have merit yet face a lower probability of conviction at 
trial—the resolution of which would not be cost-effective under the 
basic enforcement set-up. For example, in some instances, the firm 
and the prosecutor may obtain facts early in an investigation that lead 
both to recognize that a case has merit despite a low probability of 
conviction at trial. Of course, the prosecutor can allocate more 
resources to the case to improve the chance of prevailing at trial. 
Ultimately, however, some such cases will be declined. But as an 
alternative to declining the case, the prosecutor may offer a NPA to 
obtain a timely resolution (with the cooperation of the firm) and a 
smaller sanction (than under a plea agreement or at trial) in exchange 
for walking away without a criminal conviction. From this 
perspective, a NPA would allow the prosecutor to impose a criminal 
sanction in the marginal case that would otherwise be declined. Given 
the option of proposing a NPA, the same prosecutor who would not 
develop a case due to its complexity might seek to build that same 
case. The effect is not just to increase the number of cases that are 
settled but also to expand the scope of settled cases to include cases 
that would otherwise be declined. 
For example, consider the following. Thus far, we have assumed 
that upon being detected in a violation, each firm faces the same 
probability ݌ of conviction. We relax this condition here. Suppose 
that once the government catches an offender through inspection, 
there are two types of cases: a case with a high probability of 
conviction at trial ሺ݌ுሻ, and a case with a low probability of 
conviction at trial (݌௅), where ݌ு ൐ ݌௅. Assume these probabilities are 
common knowledge. The idea is that even among all cases that have 
merits, there may be a difference in the availability of evidence with 
which to build the case. Suppose now that the parties face the 
following costs. If the case goes to trial, both sides need to spend $100 
in case preparation costs (e.g., attorney fees for the corporate 
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defendant). If the case were to end in a guilty plea, both sides need to 
spend $50. Finally, if the case were to be resolved by way of a NPA, 
resolution takes place much earlier and both sides need to spend only 
$12 to come to an agreement. 
Under this cost assumption, suppose we have an instance of a 
caught offender and the offender faces a high probability of 
conviction, ݌ு. The monetary sanction in case of a guilty verdict at 
trial is ݏ଴. The expected cost of going to trial for the offender is ݌ுݏ଴ ൅ 100. Meanwhile, if we assume the prosecutor seeks to increase 
the aggregate proceeds that accrue from settlement while limiting the 
use of its own resources, the expected value of going to trial for the 
prosecutor is ݌ுݏ଴ െ 100. On the other hand, if both parties were to 
work toward getting a plea with a sanction amount of ݌ுݏ଴, then the 
respective values are ݌ுݏ଴ ൅ 50 and ݌ுݏ଴ െ 50, which would be better 
than the trial option for both parties. In addition, the prosecutor will 
find it worthwhile to seek a plea as long as ݌ுݏ଴ ൐ 50. The 
calculation, however, is different when we have a low-type offender. 
If the offender faces a low probability of conviction, it may be the 
case that the prosecutor, if he were restricted to a plea or a trial, 
would find neither worthwhile. Specifically, if ݌௅ݏ଴ ൏ 50 (either 
because the sanction ݏ଴ is low or the probability ݌௅ is sufficiently low 
or both), then the prosecutor who compares his own cost against the 
gain from sanctions collected will bring neither the plea nor seek to 
go to trial.  
From this perspective, the policy reflected in the DOJ’s 
memoranda, starting with the Holder Memo, can be seen as 
encouraging the use of NPA in cases with ݌௅ (e.g., low culpability). If 
the prosecutor has the option of seeking a NPA, then even if 
݌௅ݏ଴ ൏ 50, as long as if ݌௅ݏ଴ ൐ 12, the prosecutor will find it 
worthwhile to seek that simple sanction of ݌௅ݏ଴. Therefore, the 
assumption that a NPA can be negotiated by the prosecutor more 
quickly and more easily than a plea implies that the prosecutor will be 
able to resolve more cases criminally, including those cases for which 
the prosecutor previously lacked any credible threat to pursue. The 
effect is to increase the number of cases that are settled with a 
criminal sanction as opposed to a declination. In this manner, use of 
non-plea settlement can promote greater deterrence.  
Consistent with this analysis, Lanny A. Breuer, a former head of 
the DOJ Criminal Division, remarked as follows: 
 
When the only tool [the prosecutors] had to use in cases of 
corporate misconduct was a criminal indictment, prosecutors 
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sometimes had to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. More 
often, they just walked away. In the world we live in now . . . 
prosecutors have much greater ability to hold companies 
accountable for misconduct than we used to . . . .81 
 
Relatedly, a recent study by Alexander and Cohen notes that there 
may be systematic differences in the cases that are disposed of under 
plea agreements as compared to those that are disposed of under 
NPAs and DPAs. They note in particular that (1) “the average 
offense scores for DPAs and NPAs are larger than that for pleas” 
(that is, DPAs and NPAs generally involve more severe crimes); (2) 
the base fine is higher for DPAs and NPAs, and monetary penalties 
are also higher;82 and (3) “mean and median culpability scores are 
markedly lower for NPAs and DPAs than for plea agreements when 
averaged across all offense categories.”83 Of these, the third 
observation is consistent with the analysis in this Section suggesting 
that the use of NPAs (due to lowered cost of preparation) can 
incentivize prosecutors to resolve cases that present low probabilities 
of conviction. 
B. Use of NPA to Obtain a Commitment to Future Cooperation 
Another possible use of NPAs is that such agreements can 
commit the firm to reforms and mandates that give the prosecutor 
easier information access post-settlement and thereby reduce the 
prosecutor’s future costs of inspection and investigation. This is 
different from the use of a NPA in our basic model, where the effect 
is to achieve cooperation to lower the current costs of investigation. 
Instead, the NPA commits the firm to what is essentially future 
cooperation. 
For example, note that a significant number of NPAs involve 
some type of mandate, governance reform or waiver of privileges.84 
 
 81. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 
New York City Bar Association (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr
/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html [https://perma.cc/BP97-GQ3G]. 
 82. They note, however, that there is no evidence that the total monetary sanctions 
under NPAs and DPAs differ relative to the fine that would be assessed under the 
Guidelines if the offender had instead settled for a plea agreement. See Alexander & 
Cohen, supra note 4, at 585. 
 83. Id. at 576–77 
 84. Id. at 540–42. Reforms and mandates through a NPA can commit the firm to a 
more effective regime for self-reporting than under traditional enforcement. See generally 
Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (exploring alternatives to strict liability that may increase the 
efficiency of enforcement against corporate criminal defendants); Jennifer Arlen & 
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According to Alexander and Cohen, in the sample of ninety NPAs 
collected between 1997 and 2011, fifty-two (58%) required training, 
the same number of them required some changes in accounting or 
auditing reforms, and forty-nine (54%) required compliance-related 
reforms.85 Similarly, in the same sample of NPAs, eighty-three (92%) 
contained a waiver of right to speedy trial and/or statute of 
limitations, twenty-three (26%) a waiver of attorney-client privilege, 
and twenty-two (24%) a waiver of attorney work-product privileges.86 
These reform measures do not directly provide any type of tangible 
evidence that can help the prosecutor build her case in the present. 
Rather, they can be seen as measures that will increase the 
probability of conviction and lower the cost of investigation in the 
case of a future violation. 
Now consider the following. Given a case in the current period 
with a low probability of conviction, the prosecutor may not find it 
worthwhile to seek a conviction through a plea. He may instead draft 
a NPA to impose governance reforms and waiver of privileges, such 
that if the offending firm were to commit a violation (again) in the 
future, upon its detection, the defendant will face a high probability of 
conviction (and in equilibrium a plea agreement). This indicates that, 
in a repeated game, use of NPAs can bring a greater number of 
detected violations within the pool of credible threat of plea bargains, 
which can in turn promote deterrence. 
This analysis, however, raises a question: given that corporate 
defendants might see monetary sanctions and costly governance 
reforms as effective substitutes, why might the prosecutor and 
defendant have distinctly different preferences for one form over the 
other? One response is that the parties may have divergent 
expectations of the benefits of offense that may be realized in the 
future.87 More specifically, the defendant and the prosecutor may 
actually differ in their (current) preferences for monetary sanctions 
versus governance reforms. For example, if the corporate defendant 
believes that it was fortunate to get a high realization of benefit from 
committing the offense in the current period, but it is unlikely that 
any sizable benefit will again be realized from a future offense, it may 
readily agree to governance reforms and waiver of privileges. This is 
 
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (analyzing a shift from strict vicarious liability to 
duty-based schemes that mitigate liability for corporate criminal defendants). 
 85. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 588–89. 
 86. See id. at 586–87. 
 87. In other words, they may disagree about the underlying distribution of ݂ሺ∙ሻ. 
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because the defendant may expect that it will have no need or desire 
to commit any similar violation in the future. On the other hand, if 
the prosecutor believes otherwise (i.e., if the distribution of benefits is 
fat-tailed in the higher end), then he may prefer the governance 
reforms and waiver of privileges to levying a sanction in the current 
period, which will not be very high given the low probability of 
conviction the defendant faces based on the current period’s 
violation. 
In short, a prosecutor who regards the NPA as a means of 
lowering the current costs of investigation and future costs of 
detection would include governance and legal reforms as terms in the 
NPA. The ability to include governance reforms to commit the 
offending firm to better future compliance is unique to the 
prosecution of corporations, as distinct from the prosecution of 
natural persons. 
Recall that in the basic model of this paper, NPAs were 
considered as net substitutes for plea agreements. Alexander and 
Cohen, however, find that the use of NPAs (and DPAs) is correlated 
with an increase in plea agreements.88 This finding is consistent with 
the notion that NPAs act as complements to plea agreements. Our 
extension of the basic model, here, to a multi-period model with 
differentiated case quality points to the use of NPA as a complement 
to traditional plea settlement that could lead to an overall increase in 
plea agreements in the long-run. 
C. Use of NPA with Selection Effects That Encourage Investment in 
Compliance Programs 
Finally, we note that the prosecutor’s use of a NPA may have, in 
the short term, the effect of changing the profile of the corporate 
offender who pleads guilty to an offense, and in the long term, the 
effect of encouraging firms to invest more fully in robust compliance 
programs. This is distinct from self-reporting of an undetected 
offense. That is, firms may invest in compliance programs that 
eliminate obstacles within the firm to providing the prosecutor with 
authentic and timely cooperation, thereby qualifying for the offer of a 
lenient NPA sanction, should the firm commit an offense. To 
illustrate, we relax the assumption that all caught firms qualify for 
leniency and consider the effect on the profile of the firms that are 
caught. 
Recall that, under the USAM, the prosecutor’s decision to offer 
 
 88. See id. at 541. 
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a NPA depends on the authenticity of a firm’s cooperation. If we 
assume that each firm can have greater leniency with the NPA, we 
might expect every firm whose only other alternative is pleading 
guilty to cooperate. This was indeed our assumption in Part III. But in 
practice, there may be a number of different reasons as to why a firm, 
caught for a violation, would choose not to cooperate with the 
prosecutor. Here we note that, for a given offense and relation of the 
firm to the offense, the cost (or ease) of cooperation to the offending 
firm may be lower if the firm has prior experience as the target of a 
criminal investigation or has otherwise prepared to be an 
investigation target. A firm that has committed criminal offenses 
would be familiar with the procedures of the Department of Justice 
and the expectations of its prosecutors. Such a firm may know what is 
required, at minimum, to obtain credit for authentic cooperation and 
thus a lenient NPA. In contrast, a company caught in its first offense 
would face greater uncertainty as to what forms of cooperation are 
sufficiently authentic to qualify for a lenient NPA. The firm may be 
complex, and the prosecutor may find it difficult to instruct the firm 
on how to cooperate. Authentic cooperation may require initiative on 
the part of the company. As in all regulatory compliance, the implicit 
assumption here is that there is a fixed up-front cost of compliance 
with the authentic-cooperation requirements of the prosecutor and 
that firms in their first caught offenses face obstacles to cooperation 
that other firms do not face. 
For these reasons, the willingness and ability of each caught 
company to offer authentic cooperation may depend on its prior level 
of preparation for cooperating with the government. To be sure, guilt 
can provide an incentive not to cooperate. Yet even holding the 
culpability of the firm constant, it seems that a firm that is unfamiliar 
with the procedures of the Department of Justice and its prosecutors 
would face greater obstacles to determining how to cooperate than 
another firm with a history as an investigation target. Similarly, firms 
in regulated industries may be better prepared to deal with the 
government and thus better able to respond to a call for cooperation. 
This would make them more likely to provide the authentic 
cooperation needed to be offered a NPA settlement. 
An empirical implication is that—holding constant the offense 
and the severity of the prospective sanction—the frequency of non-
cooperation may be higher among firms that have less prior 
experience dealing with the Department of Justice as an investigation 
target and less prior experience in dealing with government 
investigators generally. In addition, we would expect the frequency of 
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non-cooperation to decline over time as firms become more familiar 
with the Department’s procedures and practices. In the long-run, 
however, the overall effect may be that firms recognize that investing 
in robust compliance programs can increase their chances of getting 
offered a NPA in the event of an offense, and therefore, the 
prosecutor’s selective use of NPAs (for those firms that can provide 
authentic cooperation) may have the effect of encouraging the firms 
to invest in compliance programs early on. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have identified efficient government 
resource allocation, post-detection and pre-trial, as a beneficial 
outcome of the introduction of NPAs as an alternative to plea 
agreements for the purpose of obtaining cooperation from caught 
firms to resolve corporate criminal investigations. We used a 
model from the prior literature on enforcement to assess the 
implications of more efficient investigations of caught offenders, 
post-detection. 
The policy of limiting the use of NPAs to cases where the 
company provides authentic cooperation can serve several 
enforcement objectives. First, the use of NPAs to obtain 
cooperation can lead to enhanced deterrence and improved 
resource allocation by lowering the cost to prosecutors of 
investigating companies, post-detection and pre-trial. From a 
traditional social welfare perspective, the efficiency of a NPA 
relative to a plea agreement depends on whether the returns to 
resources saved through cooperation—in the form of increased ex 
ante probability of facing a sanction for the offender—exceed the 
loss of deterrence due to the leniency of the sanction provided to 
obtain cooperation under the policy, other things equal. We also 
find that the use of NPAs can facilitate efficient substitution 
between an informal sanction that attaches to criminal conviction 
(net cost to society) and a monetary fine (a transfer). Put 
differently, the elimination of a public guilty plea can transform an 
inefficient informal sanction into a formal monetary sanction in 
some instances. 
We also identified possible extensions of the basic model that 
incorporate bundling. First, the use of NPAs can be combined with 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to facilitate efficient 
discrimination between cases with high versus low costs of 
resolution, allowing more cases to be resolved through criminal 
sanctions rather than declination. Second, the use of NPAs may be 
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combined with requirements for enhanced future policing to 
provide for an efficient substitution between a current sanction 
and the future probability of conviction. Third, the practice of 
offering NPAs selectively to those offenders who can provide 
authentic cooperation may in the long run have the effect of 
encouraging firms to invest more in robust compliance programs. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We prove the results of Proposition 1 for 
a slightly more general case in which the fraction of the population of 
caught firms that can provide authentic cooperation is assumed to be 
ߙ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሿ, which is realized for each firm after the offense is 
committed. If we let ߙ ൌ 1, the result of the original model follows. 
Under the basic enforcement regime in which only plea agreements 
are available, the prosecutor who seeks to maximize deterrence solves 
the following optimization problem: 
max௤మ,௤య ݍଵݍଶݍଷሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ 	subject	to	ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯൫1 െ
ܨሺݍଵݍଶݍଷሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻሻ൯ ൑ ܤ. 
Maximizing deterrence in this instance is equivalent to maximizing 
the expected sanction. Under the basic enforcement regime, the 
potential offender will commit a crime based on whether their 
realized benefit value is greater than ݍଵݍଶݍଷሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ. Let ܦ୮୪ୣୟ be the 
maximal deterrence achieved under this problem. Under the NPA 
regime, an offender’s ex ante expected sanction is ݍଵݍଶݍଷ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯. Thus, the prosecutor solves the following 
optimization problem: 
max௤మ௤యݍଵݍଶݍଷ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ subject to 
ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷ൫ߙߚଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯ܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯ ൬1 െ ܨ ቀݍଵݍଶݍଷ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ቁ൰ ൑ ܤ.  
Let ܦ୒୔୅ be the maximal expected sanction under the lenient NPA 
policy. To prove the first part, we show that when ߚଶ ൌ 1 and ߚଵ ൏ 1, there is ̅ݏ ൐ 0 such that for all ݏଵ ∈ ሾ0, ̅ݏሿ, the prosecutor’s 
objective of maximizing deterrence will improve by his use of 
NPA. Suppose ߚଶ ൌ 1 and ݏଶ ൌ 0. Then note that the maximands 
are identical under the two optimization problems. But ߩ ൌ ݍଵݍଶݍଷ 
will still be higher under the NPA because ߚଵ ൏ 1 and therefore 
the prosecutor can afford to choose higher ݍଵ and/or ݍଷ. (If ߚଵ ൌ 1, 
then the two budget constraints will also be identical). Therefore, 
if ݏଵ ൌ 0, then ܦ୒୔୅ ൐ ܦ୮୪ୣୟ. Now since ߩሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ and ߩ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ are both continuous in ݏଵ, it must be the case that 
for some values of ݏଵ ൐ 0, ܦ୒୔୅ will continue to remain greater 
than ܦ୮୪ୣୟ. Let ̅ݏ be the supremum over all such ݏଵ values (for 
96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018) 
2018] NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS 899 
which ܦ୒୔୅ ൐ ܦ୮୪ୣୟ), and we have the first result. To prove the 
second part, we show that for each ߚଵ ൏ 1, there exists ߚଶ∗ሺߚଵሻ ൏1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶ such that the prosecutor’s objective of maximizing 
deterrence will improve by his use of NPA if ߚଶ ൐ ߚଶ∗ሺߚଵሻ. Suppose ߚଶ ൌ 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶. Then ܦ୒୔୅ will necessarily be strictly greater than ܦ୮୪ୣୟ because, again, the maximands would be identical in the two 
optimization problems, but the budget constraint is more favorable 
toward yielding a higher ߩ in the ܦ୒୔୅ case because, again, ߚଵ ൏ 1. 
Since ߩ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ is continuous in ߚଶ, it must be 
the case that for some values of ߚଶ ൌ 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶, ܦ୒୔୅ will continue 
to remain greater than ܦ୮୪ୣୟ. Let ߚଶ∗ be the infimum over all such 
ߚଶ values (for which ܦ୒୔୅ ൐ ܦ୮୪ୣୟ), and we are done. It is clear 
that ߚଶ∗ ൐ 0. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. As with Proposition 1, we prove the 
results of Proposition 2 for the case in which the fraction of the 
population of caught firms that can provide authentic cooperation 
is assumed to be ߙ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሿ, which is realized after the offense is 
committed. For a given inspection probability ߩ ൒ 0, define  
ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺߩሻ ൌ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ
≡ න ሺܾ െ ݄ሻ݂ሺܾሻܾ݀
ஶ
௤భ௤మ௤యሺథା௦భሻെ ݏଵݍଵݍଶݍଷ	ሺ1 െ ܨሺݍଵݍଶݍଷሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻሻ
െ ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯ሺ1 െ ܨሺݍଵݍଶݍଷሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻሻ 
and 
ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩሻ ൌ ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ
≡ න ሺܾ െ ݄ሻ݂ሺܾሻܾ݀
ஶ
௤భ௤మ௤య൫ఈఉమథାሺଵିఈሻሺథା௦భሻ൯
െ ݍଵݍଶ൫ܿ୧୬ୱ୮ୣୡ୲ ൅ ݍଷሺߙߚଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሻܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲൯
ൈ ൬1 െ ܨ ቀݍଵݍଶݍଷ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ቁ൰. 
Then ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺߩሻ ൌ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ൫ݍଶ,ݍଷ൯ is the value of net social welfare 
(including enforcement resource costs) under the plea regime with 
ݍଶ and ݍଷ, and ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩሻ ൌ ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ is the corresponding 
value under the NPA regime. The set-up here is similar to Kaplow 
and Shavell’s model. In the expression for ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ൫ݍଶ,ݍଷ൯, the first 
term (the integral term) aggregates private benefits and social 
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harms of all offenses committed, the second term represents the 
informal sanctions faced by firms who would get caught and thus 
eventually plead guilty, and the final term represents the aggregate 
resource costs of inspection and investigation. Note that the formal 
sanction imposed, ߶, is not included in this expression as a cost 
because it is a simple transfer. In the expression for SW୒୔୅ሺqଶ, qଷሻ, 
the integral term again aggregates private benefits and social 
harms of all offenses committed. Note that the threshold for 
committing an offense is ݍଵݍଶݍଷ൫ߙߚଶ߶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߶ ൅ ݏଵሻ൯ under 
the NPA. The second term represents the aggregate resource costs 
of inspection and investigation, where the per-offense investigation 
cost is now reduced to ߚଵܿ୧୬୴ୣୱ୲ for the share of firms that 
cooperate. Finally, there is no term involving the informal 
sanction, ݏଵ, for firms agreeing to NPA because such informal 
sanctions only attach to convictions. Now let ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ ≡
max௤మ,௤యܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ and ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ≡ max௤మ,௤యܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ. The 
proof proceeds in the similar manner as in Proposition 1. To prove 
the first part, we show that when ߚଶ ൌ 1 and ߚଵ ൏ 1, there is ̅ݏ ൐ 0 
such that for all ݏଵ ∈ ሺ0, ̅ݏሿ, the prosecutor’s objective of 
maximizing overall social welfare will improve by his use of NPA. 
Suppose ߚଶ ൌ 1 and ݏଵ ൌ 0. Then it is clear that ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ . 
This can be seen as follows. Let ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൌ ݍଵݍଶ∗ݍଷ∗ be the optimal ex 
ante probability of sanction chosen for ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺݍଶ, ݍଷሻ so that 
ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ ≡ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ሻ ൌ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺݍଶ∗, ݍଷ∗ሻ. By assumption ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൐ 0. 
Now note that in this case we necessarily have ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅൫ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൯ ≡
ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺݍଶ∗, ݍଷ∗ሻ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺݍଶ∗, ݍଷ∗ሻ ≡ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ൫ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൯. This is true 
since the two integral terms become identical and the resource cost 
will favor ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ሻ, since the expressions become identical 
except for ߚଵ, which is smaller than 1. In addition, ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ is free of 
the informal sanction term. Then it follows that ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ≡
maxఘܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩሻ ൒ ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺݍଶ∗, ݍଷ∗ሻ ൌ ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅൫ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൯ ൐
ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ൫ߩ୮୪ୣୟ∗ ൯ ൌ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ . At this point, since both ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩሻ and 
ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟሺߩሻ are continuous in ݏଵ, it must necessarily be the case that 
for some ݏଵ ൐ 0, ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗  will continue to hold. Let ̅ݏ be 
the supremum over all such ݏଵ values (for which ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ ), 
and we have shown the first part. To prove the second part, we 
show that for each ߚଵ ൏ 1, there exists ߚଶ∗ሺߚଵሻ ൏ 1 ൅ ݏଵ ോ ߶ such 
that the prosecutor’s objective of maximizing overall social welfare 
will improve by his use of NPA if ߚଶ ൐ ߚଶ∗ሺߚଵሻ. Suppose ߚଶ ൏ 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶. Then a similar argument can establish that 
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ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗ . At this point, since ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅ሺߩሻ is continuous in ߚଶ, 
it must necessarily be the case that for some ߚଶ ൏ 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶, ܵ ୒ܹ୔୅∗ ൐ ܵ ୮ܹ୪ୣୟ∗  will continue to hold. Let ߚଶ be the infimum over 
all such ߚଶ values, and then we have a positive measure of leniency 
for which is welfare-improving (for all ߚଶ ∈ ሺߚଶ, 1 ൅ ݏଵ/߶ሿ). This 
shows the second part, and we are done. Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018) 
902 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
